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Abstract 
The One Belt One Road initiative is found to promote China’s overseas lending in the 
belt road countries, especially for countries along the continental route. Such effect 
strengthens and persists for at least three years. Our findings show that launching a 
national strategy could be a decisive determinant of one country’s outbound loans. 
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“China’s commitment to building infrastructure in countries covered by its ‘One Belt, 
One Road’ initiative - a scheme to boost development along ancient ‘silk road’ trading 
routes between China and Europe - is revealed by data showing that the lion’s share 
of Beijing’s recent overseas lending pledges have been in countries that lie along the 
routes.” 
                                                                                       
                                                                                    Financial Times (June 18, 2015) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Banks from developed countries often provide credits to developing countries 
(Dymski, 2003), as marginal returns are usually higher in less developed regions 
(Healey, 1995). Despite extensive studies regarding advanced countries’ overseas 
lending (Goldberg, 2002; Porzecanski, 1981), that of large developing countries such 
as China is largely left uncharted.  
In addition to economic considerations, developing countries’ overseas lending 
features political reasons, especially for state-owned banks having such objectives 
rather than profit maximization goals (Berger et al., 2004; Berger, 2007; Dinc, 2005).1 
As China becomes an active international lender in recent decades, it is pivotal to ask 
whether and how China’s overseas lending is motivated by its recent foreign policies. 
This inspires our study of the grand One Belt One Road (OBOR) policy initiative and 
it is intriguing to investigate whether China’s aggregate lending favors the OBOR 
countries in the wake of this national strategy.2 
 
1
 Not surprisingly, China’s official commitments are also found to be primarily driven by its foreign 
policy (Dreher & Duchs, 2016; Dreher et al., 2018). 
2
 China’s overseas lending is mainly through its state-owned banks (Horn et al., 2019). It includes the 
two state-owned policy banks (China Export-Import Bank and China Development Bank) and the four 
state-owned commercial banks (The Bank of China, the Agricultural Bank of China, the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China and China Construction Bank).  
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The OBOR initiative was announced by President Xi Jinping in autumn 2013 
during his visit in Kazakhstan, where he unveiled the vision of an ‘Economic Belt’ (i.e. 
the land belt) linking China with Central Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and ends 
up in Western Europe. Soon, President Xi proposed a similar ‘Maritime Silk Road’ (i.e. 
the sea road), which runs through Southeast Asia, the Persian Gulf and the 
Mediterranean, to the same destination as the Economic Belt. Comprising both the land 
belt and the sea road, the OBOR initiative is not only a network of ports, railways, roads, 
pipelines connecting China with the targeted regions, but a blueprint that access to new 
markets for trade and investments, and diplomatic policies to enhance multilateral 
relationships. Up to 2017, the OBOR strategy covers 68 target countries with around 8 
trillion dollars invested in infrastructures such as transportation networks, energy, and 
telecommunications (Balding, 2017; Moser, 2017). 
This paper contributes to the existing literature in two folds. First, it mostly relates 
to recent works investigating the impacts of the OBOR initiative on trade and 
investments (e.g. Du & Zhang, 2018; Herrero & Xu, 2017; Hurley et al., 2019; Li et al., 
2019). Furthermore, there are only narrative descriptions rather than statistical 
evidences discussing China’s loans and grants to OBOR countries (Bräutigam, 2011; 
Cheng, 2016; Kynge, 2015; Lin & Wang, 2017; Yu, 2017). Our work fills the gap and 
establishes a causal relationship of the policy impact on China’s outbound loans. 
Second, studies relating to China’s overseas lending (Dreher & Fuchs, 2016; 
Dreher et al., 2018; Hurley et al., 2019) often do not take “hidden debts” (i.e., 
undisclosed foreign official lending flows) into account. Zucman (2013) and Coppola 
et al. (2019) argue that China’s lending to developing countries involves offshore 
financial centers and/or borrowers’ foreign banks, which make China’s oversea loans 
hard to track. Since such opaqueness could potentially bias the results, we use a new 
data set complied by Horn et al. (2019) that explicitly addresses such problems. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data 
and variables, Section 3 shows the identification strategies, Section 4 presents the 
empirical results, Section 5 checks the robustness of the results and Section 6 concludes. 
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1. Data and variables 
 
Our main data is from Horn et al. (2019), which includes oversea debt stocks 
owned by Chinese official and state-owned creditors. It mitigates the “hidden debt” 
problem by matching from both debtors’ and creditors’ sides, namely the Debtor 
Reporting System (DRS) and the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) Locational 
Banking Statistics. The data is considered as one of the most reliable and updated 
sources of China’s overseas lending. Moreover, our country year-varying control 
variables in section 3 are from the Penn World Table 9.0 (Feenstra et al., 2015). 
We mainly follow Du & Zhang (2018) to construct the belt-road country list. We 
also manually check the news and update the country list, as the coverage of the OBOR 
is constantly expanding. According to China’s official announcements or news reports, 
we further collect the years of agreement signed with those OBOR countries, which we 
use in section 5.3 
Our final sample contains 105 recipient countries, with 51 OBOR countries (38 on 
the land belt and 13 along the sea road) from 2010 to 2017.4 Table 1 presents the 
summary statistics of the main variables and Appendix Table A lists the variable 
definitions and their sources. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
2. Identification Strategy 
 
To gauge the impact of the OBOR initiative on China’s overseas lending, we 
employ a difference-in-differences (DD) strategy, following Du & Zhang (2018) and 
Mao et al. (2019). Specifically, we use the OBOR countries as the treatment group and 
 
3
 The country list and their OBOR signature years are provided in the online supplementary material, 
Table A1 and Table A2 respectively. 
4
 Our choice of the start year is standard and follows the related literature such as Du & Zhang (2018). 
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the non-OBOR countries as the control group. Treating the policy announcement in late 
2013 as an exogenous shock, we define years on or after 2014 as the post period, and 
year 2010 to 2013 as the pre-shock period. Our baseline DD model is thus specified as 
follows: 
  𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 × 𝑂𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                            (1) 
 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 is the logarithm of China’s total overseas lending to country i in year t. 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡  is a dummy variable and equals to 1 if t is after year 2014 and 0 otherwise. 𝑂𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑖 is an indicator variable and equals to 1 if the recipient country i is an OBOR 
country and 0 otherwise. 𝛾𝑖𝑡 is a vector of country i’s year-varying controls such as 
GDP, population, capital stock, exchange rate, etc. Note that model (1) does not include 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 and 𝑂𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑖, as they are absorbed by the recipient country (𝜃𝑖) and the year fixed 
effects (𝛼𝑡) respectively. The standard error is clustered at borrower country level to 
account for potential serial correlations within that country. Moreover, loan 
commitments could also be path-dependent, as loans to developing countries often 
follow schedules spanning over years (Kraay, 2014). To alleviate such concern, we 
include lagged loan amount in some specifications. We also present results 
incorporating the lagged country controls.  
To substantiate our argument that the change in China’s overseas lending is solely 
due to the OBOR initiative, we adopt the following time-varying DD model that treats 
the OBOR agreement year as the shock year: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                                  (2) 
 
where 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable and equals to 1 after country i signs the 
agreement with China in year t, and 0 otherwise. Other notations and the cluster 
standard error are the same as model (1). The coefficient of interest, 𝛽1, estimates how 
loan amount changes for signatory i.  
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3. Empirical Results 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Figure 1 presents the coefficients of year fixed effect from 2011 to 2017, using 2010 
as the base year. The advantage of this standard approach is to control for countries’ 
unobserved time-invariant heterogeneities (Schularick, et al., 2012). It is observed that 
the OBOR countries tend to receive more loans and the growth rate also increases after 
2014. In contrast, the non-OBOR countries have relative steady experience through 
2011 to 2017, reflecting the fact that the OBOR strategy neither promotes nor harms 
their loans. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Next, we turn to our DD analysis. Table 2 shows the result of the pre-trend analysis. 
As all pre-shock year interaction terms are not significant, the parallel trend assumption 
of our DD strategy is thus valid. That is, the commitment loan amounts between the 
OBOR and the non-OBOR countries exhibit no statistical differences for the years prior 
to the policy announcement. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Then we turn to our main results examining the impact of the OBOR initiative on 
China’s overseas lending. Column (1) and (2) of Table 3 show significant and 
consistent positive effects of this national strategy by comparing the changes between 
the OBOR countries and the non-OBOR countries, regardless of whether lagged 
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country controls are included or not.5 The results still hold in column (3) and (4) when 
controlling for the lagged loans, ruling out the possibility that the increased lending 
after the policy initiative is purely due to the previous loan agreements. In particular, 
the positive significant coefficient of lagged one lending supports the argument that 
China’s policy loans could be path-dependent (Kraay, 2014; Mattlin & Nojonen, 2015). 
Quantitatively, the coefficient in column (4) shows that on average, China’s oversea 
lending to the OBOR countries increases by 98 percent after this grant policy initiative. 
Next, we explore the potential heterogeneities on loans to the continental and the 
maritime routes. Columns (5) to (8) exhibit a strong inclination on loans to the land belt 
countries, after controlling country lagged controls and/or lagged loans. It implies, 
according to column (8), that the land belt countries’ loans are about 1.3 times higher 
in the post-strategy years relative to those of sea road countries. Such drastic expansion 
might be justified by the large-scale infrastructure projects in the land belt countries 
(Cerutti & Zhou, 2018), which is consistent with the findings regarding China’s 
outward direct investments (ODI) (Du & Zhang, 2018). 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
We further show the dynamic effect of the OBOR initiative on China’s overseas 
loans in Fig. 2, using 2010 as the base year. Despite the insignificant differences 
between the OBOR and the non-OBOR countries in pre-shock years, it is observed that 
the aggregate lending upsurges instantaneously in response to the policy announcement 
in year 2014. Moreover, such effect persists and escalates until the end our sample 
period. A plausible explanation is that a government’s official lending program may 
send a positive signal to state-owned banks (Kawai & Liu, 2001), which encourages 
them to involve more heavily in the OBOR countries. Overall, the dynamic analysis 
 
5
 Note that the number of observations of our results does not decrease when including lagged 
variables, as Horn et al. (2019)’s data starts in 2000 while the first year in our estimations is 2010. 
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suggests the long run vision of this national strategy and the increasing commitments 
from Chinese official creditors.  
 
4. Robustness check 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
One potential critique could be that our results might be purely driven by other 
factors rather than the OBOR initiative itself, as many other confounding incidents 
affecting China’s official lending could take place in model (1)’s common shock year 
setting. To address the concern, we employ an extended DD model incorporating one 
crucial recipient country time-varying factor, the signature year of the OBOR 
agreement, into the benchmark model, as China signed the OBOR agreements with 
countries in various years.  
The impacts of loans on the OBOR countries and the land-based countries are 
presented in Table 4. Column (1) and (2) indicate that the agreement to join the initiative 
causes a strongly positive effect on China’s overseas lending relative to their non-
signatory and sea-road peers respectively, suggesting the substantial supports from 
Chinese official creditors in advocating this national strategy. Both specifications 
control for the lagged treatment 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡  up to three years, and no significant 
changes of China’s lending are found prior to the year of signature. Thus, they alleviate 
the reverse causality concerns and show the robustness of our estimations. That is, it is 
not the loan commitments per se that entice countries to join the OBOR initiative and 
to sign the agreements.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Using a novel and rigorous aggregate loan data, this paper investigates whether 
China’s overseas lending favors the One Belt One Road countries. Our difference-in-
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differences results show that the initiative does promote China’s outbound lending, and 
especially to the land belt countries. The impact intensifies and continues throughout 
our sample period. Our results are robust if adopting the year of signature as an 
alternative shock. Overall, our findings contribute to the literature that a national 
strategy’s launch could be a critical determinant of one country’s overseas loans. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics. 
This table presents the summary statistics. Detailed definitions of all the variables are 
listed in Appendix Table A. 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Loan Amount (Log) 839 19.384 4.744 0.000 24.344 
GDP (Log) 839 26.310 1.912 21.294 30.894 
Population (Log) 776 18.568 1.750 13.454 23.318 
Capital Stock (Log) 776 28.424 1.870 23.535 33.333 
Depreciation Rate (Ratio) 776 0.049 0.014 0.021 0.102 
Exchange Rate (Ratio)  776 1129.850 3510.052 0.088 33226.300 
Capital Services (Ratio) 560 1.132 0.239 0.137 3.034 
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Table 2 Parallel trend test. 
This table presents the results of the parallel trend test. The dependent variable is the logarithm of 
China’s aggregate loan amount to the recipient country i. Each pre-shock year dummy is interacted 
with the OBOR country dummy before the policy announcement. For brevity, we do not report the 
estimate for 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 × 𝑂𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑖. Country fixed effect is also included. Robust standard errors, clustered 
at recipient country level, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 (1) 
VARIABLES Loans 
Year 2011𝑡 * 𝑂𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑖  -0.705 
 (0.564) 
Year 2012𝑡  * 𝑂𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑖 -0.365 
 (0.467) 
Year 2013𝑡  * 𝑂𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑖 -0.781 
 (0.568) 
Constant 18.27*** 
 (0.220) 
Country FE Yes 
Observations 839 
Adjusted R-squared 0.698 
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Table 3 The impact of the OBOR policy on China’s overseas lending. 
This table shows the DD results investigating the impact of the OBOR policy on China’s overseas lending. The dependent 
variable is the logarithm of China’s aggregate loan amount to the recipient country i. Both country controls, country and 
year fixed effects are included in all specifications. Column (1) to (4) are the DD results of all countries. Column (1) is the 
baseline and column (2) adds the country lagged controls. Column (3) and (4) include the lagged loans up to 3 years with 
and without lagged country controls. Columns (5) to (8) show the corresponding results for land belt countries. Robust 
standard errors, clustered at recipient country level, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
   All Countries  The OBOR Countries  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Loans  Loans Loans   Loans Loans Loans   Loans   Loans 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 * 𝑂𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑖 1.378** 1.376*** 1.010*** 0.981** 
 
  
 
 
(0.525) (0.509) (0.371) (0.399) 
 
  
 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 * 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖     2.653*** 2.893*** 1.323** 1.347* 
    
 (0.908) (0.965) (0.636) (0.713) 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 (-1)   0.494*** 0.502***   0.504*** 0.488*** 
   (0.0731) (0.0755)   (0.0870) (0.0756) 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 (-2)   0.0376*** -0.0203   -0.0313 0.0371 
   (0.0138) (0.0276)   (0.0254) (0.0672) 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑡 (-3)   -0.0173 -0.0133   -0.0163 -0.0170 
   (0.0206) (0.0194)   (0.0505) (0.0624) 
Constant 70.70 36.5 -17.41 -60.58 135.1 54.53 -5.156 -235.5 
 
(158.1) (164.8) (123.5) (123.6) (292.3) (300.9) (229.6) (238.8) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Lag Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 560 560 560 560 280 280 280 280 
Adjusted R-squared 0.807 0.812 0.855 0.859 0.820 0.825 0.859 0.868 
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Table 4 The impact of signing the OBOR agreement on China’s overseas 
lending. 
This table shows the time-varying DD results investigating the impact of the OBOR agreement 
on China’s overseas lending. The dependent variable is the logarithm of China’s aggregate loan 
amount to the recipient country i. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡it is a dummy variable and equals 1 after country 
i signs the agreement with China in year t, and 0 otherwise. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡* 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖 is a dummy 
variable and equals 1 after land-based country i signs the agreement with China in year t, and 
0 otherwise. The country fixed effect, the year fixed effect, country controls and lagged 
treatment variables 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡it up to three years are included in all specifications. Column (1) 
presents the result for the OBOR countries and column (2) is for the land belt countries. Robust 
standard errors, clustered at recipient country level, are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Loans  Loans  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 1.066* 
 
 
(0.562) 
 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡* 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖  1.959* 
  (1.007) 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 (-1) 0.298 0.539 
 
(0.413) (0.946) 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 (-2) -1.037 0.545 
 
(0.699) (1.464) 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 (-3) -0.135 0.0471 
 
(0.672) (1.599) 
Constant 3.994 199.2 
 
(157.7) (337.3) 
Country FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Country Controls Yes Yes 
Country Lag Controls Yes Yes 
Observations 560 280 
Adjusted R-squared 0.812 0.826 
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Figure 1 The trend of China’s over sea lending to the OBOR and the non-OBOR 
countries. 
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Figure 2 The dynamic effects of the OBOR initiative in China’s oversea loans. 
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Appendix Table A Variable Definitions and Sources 
 
Variable  Sources Definition 
Loan Amount (Log) Horn et al. (2019) Natural logarithm of the estimated total external debt owed to China (USD).  
GDP (log) Horn et al. (2019) Natural logarithm of Nominal GDP in USD. 
Population (log) Penn World Table 9.0 Natural logarithm of the country’s population. 
Capital Stock (log) Penn World Table 9.0 Natural logarithm of the capital stock at constant 2011 prices in USD. 
Depreciation Rate Penn World Table 9.0 Average depreciation rate of the capital stock. 
Exchange Rate Penn World Table 9.0 Official exchange rate (national currency / USD). 
Capital Services Penn World Table 9.0 Capital services at constant 2011 national prices (2011=1). 
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Table A1 Loan recipient country list. 
This table lists all the recipient countries in our analysis, as to their alphabetical orders. 
Countries denoted by # and * are the land-road countries and the sea-belt countries 
respectively. 
 
Albania* Dominica Mauritius Tanzania 
Algeria Ecuador Mexico Togo 
Angola Egypt* Mongolia# Tonga# 
Argentina Equatorial Guinea Montenegro* Turkey# 
Armenia#  Eritrea Morocco Turkmenistan# 
Azerbaijan# Ethiopia Mozambique Uganda 
Bahamas Fiji* Myanmar* Ukraine# 
Bangladesh* Gabon Namibia Uruguay 
Belarus# Ghana Nepal# Uzbekistan# 
Benin# Guinea Niger Vanuatu 
Bolivia Guyana Nigeria* Venezuela 
Bosnia#  India* Oman# Vietnam* 
Botswana Indonesia* Pakistan# Yemen, Rep.* 
Brazil Iran# Papua New Guinea Zambia 
Bulgaria#  Jamaica Peru Zimbabwe 
Burkina Faso# Jordan# Philippines* 
Burundi# Kazakhstan# Romania# 
Cabo Verde# Kenya* Russia# 
Cambodia*  Kyrgyzstan# Rwanda 
Cameroon Laos* Samoa 
Central African Republic Lebanon# Senegal 
Chad Lesotho Serbia* 
Chile Liberia Seychelles 
Colombia Macedonia, FYR# Sierra Leone 
Comoros# Madagascar South Africa 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Malawi# South Sudan# 
Congo, Rep. Malaysia* Sri Lanka* 
Costa Rica Maldives# Sudan# 
Cote d'Ivoire# Mali Suriname 
Djibouti Mauritania Tajikistan# 
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Table A2 The signatory years of the One Belt One Road countries. 
This table illustrates the signatory years of the recipient countries, as to their alphabetical orders and the news sources respectively. 
 
Country Sign year Sources 
Albania 2017 http://wmzh.china.com.cn/2018-11/29/content_40596228.htm  
Armenia  2016 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=2lDm00NjrtMTZMwmOQaGNtJ3Nk8-
cx4ERPZqGlxErGuGXO7lMAnpfJCvIpLVb_kP1IoiXPz3l5moRti2cunAQESgI2iLSHYtKkSsHmARYIm&wd=&eqid=d49
af4dd0006d564000000065dde42c7  
Azerbaijan 2015 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=7-
iWERPnubMphUG6FKia0mtuVJvGmFD_vtG7Ynyz8TIGBujozJpNrWDkrYZ1AmkIgJwFUr91iUfgXTdiO_4-
P15jYSpjf__GBh77qT0DoIK&wd=&eqid=fb3fbe1c00045fc8000000065dde37d2  
Bangladesh 2016 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=z9gsN2EIlLu68wij7bK0YG14Y5LEWOBks5JVIBmd9EEYLa9JBMQOKJ-
ODSrT1watS7ei6nuIaAwyda9vy7nemGpweRhjq7jVjOxrqqL43ge&wd=&eqid=91fa8848000a81a0000000065dde434e  
Belarus 2015 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=vMXenUY-
Fr8deYEQTzl0K4bHCq1_4GtW9vLAfR5608484cCQiTUBs4KD3ddzK_4fxIYjKOvHWqXMsBMY20EU3a&wd=&eqid=a
596823b0005850f000000065dde43b1  
Benin 2019 https://weibo.com/5282792576/IbzXx8hSm?type=comment  
Bosnia  2017 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=29hhs94yPOE3Hd2Ppiut8k8Ieav9of3mER1sDpTf2e2OTvtSqPmkfmNVSV5S_aQE15PM4
PQ0uX1l5rYURRyf6WIHmcE_ceuEQXxcZOrKm87&wd=&eqid=8f3561a6002f0610000000065ddd3e31  
Bulgaria  2015 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=0htgAwkyqnx_Q8WXraqpIAf7nc315TAl3bPEz3RbKSIO6QPt9zWY0W5s3En4uaxYT53
X9Tw1tXHmcw7iNeJLL03zGuwz-aeqAJWMo86bvae&wd=&eqid=906f81eb000439a9000000065dde387d  
Burkina Faso N.A. 
 
Burundi 2018 http://special.chinadevelopment.com.cn/2018zt/zflt/2018/09/1348183.shtml  
Cabo Verde 2018 http://special.chinadevelopment.com.cn/2018zt/zflt/2018/09/1348183.shtml  
Cambodia  2016 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=j52AtMrK8o8pDZDalaRTY-
RvwHnPAANLJipxUQTWeecwJN3PyjmzLnqhsI1EitAq8TcQ1aJl-daQ-
LHrR3zb8K&wd=&eqid=abe6d41b0009147f000000065dde44a7  
Comoros 2018 http://news.eastday.com/eastday/13news/auto/news/china/20180831/u7ai8024912.html  
Cote d'Ivoire 2018 http://special.chinadevelopment.com.cn/2018zt/zflt/2018/09/1348183.shtml  
Egypt 2016 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=GtFxG7zpuokIMyqCRjM-zGPSyEvnXaW2CH7Kd6RyPRVUds-LPwI2SF-
R9_D_VgRb6OuWlqxNVM6Gwz3weqexzNkRqfgkIF2qO7Eaa9vS2m2rzm_BeecBILilWLaDLgBv&wd=&eqid=f24339c9
0003a223000000065dde3240  
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Fiji 2018 http://srcf.urumqi.gov.cn/2016n/cxdt/409980.htm  
India N.A. 
 
Indonesia 2018 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=5GpeYKUQgiLrcNUqQKuxSylYjz5EbsPe8EJvH_3ojsCwwkEnALJ22Mm3l1nAIk_2&wd
=&eqid=d06c2e4700000ab6000000065dde45a3  
Iran 2016 http://mil.chinanews.com/gn/2016/01-23/7729188.shtml  
Jordan 2018 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=Rwq2kDmFhcJsS0lsYU9KOYXa0Fpl3rEDw3Z4pfWvGBfypDIAo-
dWWa9MH0q304kT&wd=&eqid=e6f89cc60001e63a000000065dde4b98  
Kazakhstan 2014 http://www.ebrun.com/20170522/231917.shtml  
Kenya 2018 http://special.chinadevelopment.com.cn/2018zt/zflt/2018/09/1348183.shtml  
Kyrgyzstan 2015 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=rDdsiSPdpEQEuPCADxuW2ynNwj7d5zuXjeZpZaZ1OywJYoAbMWoTTuWdZ-
ZVprbaw3qvCxWA78v2yOvtYuJtX1ASYG8yPq7bSqWrNNDNUwe&wd=&eqid=c328310a00020cdf000000065dde4cf7  
Laos 2016 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=mYzaGPysR2c68eyfZtvAA4Pi8PG69qz8rD2DsPXF0_2gLKFK9Q-
GWxoKDCPhr4jtsjDfNbi5iEC60oItftNDrq&wd=&eqid=a8f54561000288fa000000065dde4d0d  
Lebanon 2017 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=QwFd6ucKLE1mninPyMm639hyBJWZhYckqZHmcvIX8HLO665yVpOTcoq3D1a18n4Z
_NgBYKmIdaogm-2c8wYkSa&wd=&eqid=e1455fed0001bca1000000065dde31b3  
Macedonia, 
FYR 
2015 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=xTtW4xjQVf80jsY0XozgksE1QPGgDsW4TO8vMUjmz7fwMaSUdW4pVU0YYPgVzPan
IIh1ttZEtZRnlzm9S0V4Uq&wd=&eqid=f1ad3737000336ec000000065dde4d30  
Malawi N.A. 
 
Malaysia 2015 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=ek2op9k3tjrDnMjkJ9qNQIa6ox1WoAdMdzAIy3vb8MdIg5gaa1KbgCzgA3_fdm_SE1EFk
Tf2_VLVmEA_dADLeq&wd=&eqid=a47ef08700068b93000000065dde5485  
Maldives 2014 http://www.ebrun.com/20170522/231917.shtml  
Mongolia 2016 http://www.ebrun.com/20170522/231917.shtml  
Montenegro 2017 http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2019-08-09/doc-ihytcitm7873343.shtml  
Myanmar 2017 http://www.nanhai.org.cn/review_c/291.html  
Nepal 2017 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=XrRVArV4oshIzXWvpuGlDRwLq2UznNZH_cJOJU4KQz6_QRUzXyAKBmImH4onYO
T1nPK-ZX0F8Q_1GuSjyUvo3keUoBnIPxXtjgbJTljfEs3&wd=&eqid=be07c28000055581000000065dde5597  
Nigeria 2018 http://special.chinadevelopment.com.cn/2018zt/zflt/2018/09/1348183.shtml  
Oman 2018 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=MJpMc1KzrHukDgsJmzaoeME0sccFsGqsdL6o8WyyLufw9h3Kc_4X7TGxe5bp7RW1aJi
dCquUTEDrl_-CfudJq_O7x5INbTEoTU7UyLzg-RC&wd=&eqid=ecda24460001d6f4000000065dde4923  
Pakistan 2015 http://dy.163.com/v2/article/detail/EDNN11L50538107F.html 
Philippines 2018 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=XfWRpXTsGPUWwYKbnHu9uFEPIXKVbWBOG1W4yzKD8i9oiLlNQg2az2S5Burb6V
5l&wd=&eqid=f9a763e40004d967000000065dde3458  
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Romania 2015 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=zuYLez9JDuyS3Pmb9MWuIwnh13iifzWfUHYdXJuH7XkGnVDPM08hN7ix36hpwVudb
nIxHp3GWbAzEt0hZr-
GfBfqGZZwfWeUaTmvrXwShimu_qsiDYn3KVOrb26yccd7&wd=&eqid=bd488c660007cba7000000065dde3b7a  
Russia 2015 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=Z7yrihrARc9WZjGK_A8OCAeU82qvK7tkd0Xbr0ElK-
msIJnsfcVUTlm5KG48BOD6XKCnm2E-EHpizIEvXIE-
9HkYOGlyRRO9SeNqgcq12oy&wd=&eqid=a3b2178e0000d426000000065dde4181  
Serbia 2015 http://www.chinanews.com/tp/hd2011/2015/11-26/585506.shtml  
South Sudan 2018 http://special.chinadevelopment.com.cn/2018zt/zflt/2018/09/1348183.shtml  
Sri Lanka 2017 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=Gr6F23BtFzejCinPL1v6X4o2vNR61fsqjarr--dnXKPHFdebJdR4C0kB-
adBzgjYDbckkHEbyfWRl0xiNf1UuoEtv_f9CYlM8LGuxEYTNka&wd=&eqid=85f91dbb000531cf000000065dde39a0  
Sudan 2018 http://m.haiwainet.cn/middle/3542291/2018/0716/content_31353989_1.html  
Tajikistan 2015 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=4BDYsida3IwQuIgXuoeGJ_Lz0kD1LEBOWKjZRw8szIdvNshnq8CB-x_Qo--
NlxRH&wd=&eqid=fb85773f0003171d000000065dde4f2a  
Tonga 2018 http://sputniknews.cn/politics/201811181026869322/  
Turkey 2015 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=sU7LiD9NyPaDoZSAMPSdRScyPXBbLEPpTcMIY8S55_URmUb4J92Tde_R1D6_VTR
AQc-JAeZxWJFNvQWzQfK16BlpoRlT6kBlqmRHSZmdLKK&wd=&eqid=d3796e600008d3e5000000065dde4026  
Turkmenistan 2015 http://www.scio.gov.cn/m/31773/35507/35515/35523/Document/1625566/1625566.htm  
Ukraine 2014 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=5MYTGGoXKxyiCF7MEGlpVKZFrWnOh4-
62GoqS4PNwBexqrl8q_L9Gwg4VFbSpz69&wd=&eqid=c328310a0004696d000000065dde5707  
Uzbekistan 2015 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=SOSCA3A7QpEU5uvwcA2sZ127LraXljI99DtF7bZ7PDLt8Qn4subXf8T92qhYVg8V34Dr
hPgS6rdG20G7JQazvKUD9gW_By4VzIA22ZVfPxYjgUCzRAZXTJHTo4peEZZF&wd=&eqid=e372ea5b000b9a0b00000
0065dde5291 
Vietnam 2017 https://www.baidu.com/link?url=qzFsJP2xwugHNkaPJJbePsKrIAV9h5jSbEBRzp_fi6rqfKNCg7XHYs37FHrIX7unWMzQl
4bOJNfV-mI4QTArHZjpRetvYW-3YHH91CALP9e&wd=&eqid=f499a51a000563e2000000065dde3a83  
Yemen, Rep. 2019 http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2019-04-28/doc-ihvhiewr8617644.shtml  
 
 
